Beyond Crisis Management: The Path Towards an Effective, Pro-active and Fair European Refugee Policy. Bertelsmann Study by Mayer, Matthias M. & Mehregani, Mehrdad
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beyond Crisis Management: 
The Path Towards an Effective, Pro-active and Fair  
European Refugee Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matthias M. Mayer, Project Manager, Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Mehrdad Mehregani, Project Manager, Bertelsmann Stiftung 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beyond Crisis Management: 
The Path Towards an Effective, Pro-active and Fair    
European Refugee Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact 
 
Dr. Matthias M. Mayer 
Project Manager 
Program Integration and Education 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
+49-5241-81-81564 
matthias.mayer@bertelsmann-stiftung.de  
http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de 
  
 
 
 
 
 
         Vision Europe Summit | Page 1 
Contents 
Executive Summary .................................................................................................... 3 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 4 
2 Towards Sustainable Solutions: The Importance of Legal Routes .................... 5 
3 Lack of Legal Migration Channels for Refugees Poses Multiple       
Challenges for Europe ....................................................................................... 5 
4 The Commission’s Proposals to Reform the Common European         
Asylum System and Establish Migration Partnerships with                      
Third Countries – Up to the Task? .................................................................... 7 
4.1 Status Quo and Context ........................................................................... 7 
4.2 European Commission Proposals of 4 May 2016 ..................................... 9 
4.2.1 Reform of the Dublin Regulation ................................................. 9 
4.2.2 Extension of the Eurodac Regulation ........................................ 10 
4.2.3 Establishing an EU Agency for Asylum ..................................... 10 
4.3 European Commission Proposals of 13 July 2016 .................................. 10 
4.3.1 Reform of the Asylum Procedures Directive .............................. 10 
4.3.2 Reform of the Qualification Directive ......................................... 10 
4.3.3 Reform of the Reception Conditions Directive ........................... 11 
4.4 Proposal for an EU Resettlement Framework ......................................... 11 
4.5 Proposal for Enhanced EU Cooperation with Third Countries             
(Migration Partnerships) ......................................................................... 12 
4.6 Assessment of the European Commission’s Proposals .......................... 12 
5 Recommendations ........................................................................................... 13 
5.1 Create Safe Passages to Protection ....................................................... 14 
5.1.1 Resettlement............................................................................. 14 
5.1.2 Humanitarian Visas ................................................................... 14 
5.1.3 Private Sponsorship of Refugees .............................................. 15 
5.2 Improve National Asylum Processing and Integration Systems .............. 16 
5.2.1 Effective National Asylum Systems ........................................... 16 
5.2.2 Labour Market Integration of Refugees ..................................... 16 
5.2.3 Voluntary Return ....................................................................... 17 
5.2.4 Reform of the Dublin System .................................................... 18 
5.3 Establish Further Legal Pathways for Mixed Migration ........................... 18 
 
 
 
 
Page 2 | Vision Europe Summit 
 
 
 
5.4 Enable Protection in the Region of Origin ............................................... 19 
5.4.1 Temporary Protection in Refugee Camps in the Regions            
of Origin .................................................................................... 19 
5.4.2 Local Integration in the Region of Origin ................................... 19 
5.5 Tackle the Root Causes of Forced Migration through a Sustainable 
Foreign, Economic and Trade Policy ...................................................... 20 
5.6 Final Remark: Establish Political Will for Reform .................................... 21 
About the Authors .................................................................................................... 22 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................. 22 
References ................................................................................................................ 23 
 
  
 
 
 
         Vision Europe Summit | Page 3 
Executive Summary 
Europe urgently needs an effective, pro-active and fair refugee policy. Short-sighted policy-making 
and a narrow focus on what seemed to be in the immediate national interests have led to a 
conglomerate of European refugee policies. These policies are clearly ineffective and resulted in a 
large and partially uncontrolled refugee movement to and within Europe in 2015. Refugee flows to 
Europe are unlikely to subside soon, as many conflicts persist and the average duration of protracted 
refugee situations worldwide is on the rise. In a reaction to these circumstances, the European Com-
mission has proposed a number of initiatives to reform the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS). Consensus is more likely on the introduction of restrictions and sanctions rather than, for 
example, fair distribution systems or pooling sovereignty on the EU level by establishing a strong EU 
Agency of Asylum. Yet, especially pro-active solutions that meet Europe’s humanitarian responsi-
bilities are necessary. 
The paper puts forward policy-recommendations for a paradigm-shift from reactive to pro-active 
refugee policies. The overarching objective is to create further legal channels for refugees to seek 
protection in Europe. Measures include both national and EU-policies and are supposed to pave the 
way to a sustainable and coherent European refugee policy. The policy recommendations  are  clus-
tered in five overarching themes: create safe passages to protection, improve national asylum 
processing and integration systems, establish further legal pathways for mixed migration, enable 
protection in the region of origin, and tackle the root causes of forced migration through a sustainable 
foreign, economic and trade policy. Finally, it has to be stressed that only if we can restore Europe’s 
political will to manage refugee flows together, there will be sustainable solutions in sight. Regular 
dialogue taking into account the different resources and histories of the countries are the way 
forward. If member states can incrementally alight their different national policies, a comprehensive 
European refugee policy may follow. Given the current political differences amongst member states, 
this will be a lengthy process – but certainly worth the effort. 
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1 Introduction 
An increasing number of conflict situations and the temporary opening of new migration routes to 
Europe have led to a surge in the number of people seeking refuge in Europe. In 2015, 1,257,030 
first time asylum applications were filed in the EU, and from January to June 2016, the figure amoun-
ted to 592,795 (Eurostat, 2016a; 2016b). The high numbers of refugees dramatically exposed the 
weaknesses of the current European Asylum System (CEAS) and showed that it is clearly dys-
functional in times of high refugee inflows. These circumstances may be here to stay, as, for 
instance, the number of protracted refugee situations worldwide is on the rise. The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines protracted refugee situations as situations, 
where refugees are in exile for five or more years after their initial displacement, without immediate 
prospects for implementation of durable solutions (UNHCR, 2009). UNHCR indicates that in 2015, 
41% of the refugees under its mandate were in protracted refugee situations and the average 
duration of a protracted refugee situation constituted 26 years (UNHCR, 2016a). A comparison with 
the year 1993 shows a significant increase of 17 years (Milner, 2014, p. 153). Hence, finding 
solutions that are both sustainable and implemented must be a key priority for EU member states – 
and for the international community in general. Short-sighted policy measures, such as closing 
national borders and underfunded refugee camps (without access to education, qualifications and 
work opportunities) are not apt to deal with refugees in the long-run and might backfire significantly 
as the events of 2015 have demonstrated. Many migrants have died in an attempt to cross the 
Mediterranean and uncontrolled refugee flows to Europe in combination with hasty attempts to 
organise European solidarity through relocation of asylum seekers from Italy and Greece as well as 
resettlement of refugees from the crisis region in the Middle East led to a massive resistance from 
countries, such as, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and added further 
strain to the political climate in Europe. Chancellor Merkel, for instance, admitted in a press con-
ference in September 2016 that she had relied on the Dublin system for too long and, with hindsight, 
would have prepared Germany better for the refugee inflow of summer/autumn 2015 (Tagesschau, 
2016). 
Thus, it is only timely to discuss policy proposals on how refugee policy in Europe can be managed 
in an effective, pro-active and fair way. The UNHCR identifies three durable solutions for refugee-
hood: Resettlement to a safe country, integration in the receiving society and voluntary return 
(UNHCR, 2016c). However, these policy measures have failed to provide the envisaged durable 
solutions to a great number of  refugees  (Collett, Clewett, & Fratzke, 2016, p. 3; Long, 2014, p. 475). 
Focussing on the expansion of legal migration routes available to refugees, to supplement the three 
durable solutions, can help to improve the outcomes of refugee policy. For migration and refugee 
policy to be sustainable, it is important to be fair to all parties involved (migrants, origin countries,  
and receiving countries) – even if this is a very challenging undertaking (cf. Dräger & De Geus, 2015, 
p. 9-10). 
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The paper will first highlight the importance of legal migration routes for refugees and then outline a 
number of key challenges European refugee policy faces. Subsequently, it will briefly present the 
status quo of the CEAS and discuss the recent reform proposals of the European Commission. The 
paper will close with offering policy recommendations on the way towards an effective, pro-active 
and fair European refugee policy. 
2 Towards Sustainable Solutions: The Importance of Legal Routes 
Migrants have four kinds of legal categories to their disposal that allow them to migrate to another 
country. First, people may migrate for employment purposes; in practice, this is almost entirely re-
stricted to skilled migration (seasonal workers programmes, for instance in the agricultural sector, 
can represent an exemption). Second, states allow the migration for education reasons, most notably 
for undertaking university studies. The third legal migration path is family reunification, which means 
that members of the core family are allowed to join a person who has the legal right to reside in 
another country. The fourth possibility is to claim asylum. Even the signatory states of the Geneva 
Convention require refugees to enter their territory to file asylum. However, in order to reach their 
territory, refugees are – safe very few exceptions, such as resettlement programmes that tend to be 
quantitatively insignificant – forced to rely on irregular migration channels. 
A large share of irregular migrants are refugees, even though they might not qualify for a legally 
codified protection status. To create legal pathways for refugees is thus the most obvious option. 
However, it is not the only one. As people migrate because of a mix of motivations, some refugees 
who file for asylum might have been able to migrate using another legal category, such as employ-
ment, education, or family reunification – even though this number is likely to be limited. Never-
theless, to curb irregular migration and/or to prevent people to request asylum who have little pro-
spects to receive protection, it is important to discuss whether and under what circumstances it might 
make sense to channel these people into other legal migration categories. 
3 Lack of Legal Migration Channels for Refugees Poses Multiple 
Challenges for Europe 
European migration policy faces important challenges. One is the lack of legal migration routes to 
Europe. Currently, there are hardly any legal migration pathways that allow refugees to access 
Europe in a safe and orderly way. Under the EU-resettlement scheme of July 2015, which foresees 
to resettle a total of 22,504 persons, until mid-July 2016, only 8,268 people had been resettled. 
These figures are small compared to the 1,257,030 first time asylum applications that have been 
filed in EU members states in 2015 or the estimated 1,015,078 refugees that arrived in Europe by 
crossing the Mediterranean in 2015 (Eurostat, 2016a; UNHCR, 2016b). On a global scale, there is 
a similar picture: resettlement numbers are insignificant as there are places only available for less 
than one percent of the global refugee population (Van Selm, 2014). One of the most terrifying 
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consequences of the dearth of legal migration channels for refugees constitutes dead or missing 
migrants in the Mediterranean; UNHCR estimates 3,169 persons in 2016 (until 5 September 2016) 
(UNHCR, 2016b). In addition, there is a large number of people who have died when trying to cross 
the Sahara. A thriving smuggling industry and chaotic circumstances in transit and destinations 
countries represent further important detrimental effects. 
In an attempt to curb irregular migration from Turkey to Europe, the EU and Turkey concluded an 
agreement which stipulates that, as of 20 March 2016, all irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to 
the Greek islands (and hence into EU-territory) would be returned to Turkey. For every Syrian being 
returned to Turkey, another Syrian is supposed to be resettled to the EU and distributed between 
EU member states. However, the agreement does not represent a sustainable solution to manage 
refugee flows from Syria. Resettlement is going slow and as of end of September 2016, only 1,614 
Syrian refugees have been resettled from Turkey to Europe (European Commission, 2016j). Thus, 
the agreement cannot be seen as offering quantitatively significant legal routes for refugees to the 
EU, but rather represents a cork to stop the refugee influx. 
Another corollary of lacking legal routes for refugees, and a second important challenge, is the rise 
of mixed migration. Migration motivations of refugees and economic migrants are not always easy 
to distinguish and often people migrate for a combination of reasons, or motivations are subject to 
change.1  As a result, the asylum system is often used by (economic) migrants, who, for instance, 
seek to escape dire poverty, because of the inexistence of alternative routes for migration. Especially 
in times of high asylum claims, this adds further strain to asylum systems. Betts (2013, pp. 4-6) 
coined the term survival migration to conceptualise the problem, that many people are forced to flee 
their country of origin because of reasons, such as failed states, environmental disasters, and the 
erosion in livelihood. Betts (2013, p. 188) defines survival migrants as “persons who are outside their 
country of origin because of an existential threat to which they have no access to a domestic remedy 
or resolution.” Neither of the above causes of migration is covered by the internationally accepted 
refugee concept, which was created after the Second World War to protect people in Europe from 
individualised prosecution by their own governments (Betts, 2013, p. 188). This means that states 
tend not to offer protection status for many contemporary refugees (cf. Angenendt, Kipp & Meier, 
forthcoming). These protection gaps often force people into irregular migration channels where they 
end up filing asylum claims without much prospects of being granted a legal right to stay. 
A further challenge is the lack of an effective and fair distribution system across Europe. The Dublin 
system shifts the burden of processing arrivals to the southern “frontier countries”, such as Italy and 
Greece. In times of high asylum flows to Europe this burden amounts to a great challenge, especially 
for crisis-torn Greece. Plus, some asylum seekers try to avoid being registered in the first EU-country 
they arrive to reach a more attractive destination (for a further discussion of the shortcomings of the 
current CEAS, see section 4.1). Even though the structural deficits of the Dublin-system have been 
known for a while, EU member states have missed out on developing a fundamental alternative to 
the Dublin system (Angenendt, Kipp & Kosch, 2016, p. 2). As the majority of member states benefit 
                                               
1 For a detailed discussion of mixed migration, see Angenendt, Kipp & Meier (forthcoming). 
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from the current asymmetric burden sharing, they did not have the incentive to change the system. 
Also, more recently, the political costs of accepting relocation have risen or have even been pushed 
up by local politicians. In an attempt to restore Dublin transfers to Greece within the current system, 
the Commission has adopted a number of recommendations in February 2016, June 2016 and 
September 2016 (cf., for instance, European Commission, 2016k). 
In addition, the EU is deeply divided on whether to accept a meaningful number of refugees at all. In 
2015, Germany, Hungary and Sweden alone received 62% of asylum claims, and their share of the 
actual inflow of asylum seekers is even higher (Mayer, 2016, p. 6). It has to be mentioned, however, 
that Hungary only granted a protection status to 505 asylum seekers in 2015 (Eurostat, 2016d). 
Hence, only a few countries, most notably Germany and Sweden, have taken on the responsibility 
to accept asylum seekers in relatively large numbers. But the issue is more complex, as other states 
feel that especially Germany’s unilateral “open-door” policy induced more refugees to migrate, which, 
in turn, put strain on transit countries, such as Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia (Mayer, 2016, p. 8); 
this also applies to Austria, that, in addition to being a transit country, received a significant number 
of asylum applications. It is hard to imagine a sustainable solution to the current refugee situation 
that does not involve EU member states coming together to more fairly share the burden in some 
sort of consensus (Mayer, 2016, p. 8). 
Demographic developments are likely to increase migration pressures to Europe and reinforce the 
issues outlined above in the years to come. According to calculations issued by the United Nations, 
without migration, by the year 2050, (wider) Europe’s working age population would decline by 96 
million. Conversely, Africa’s working age population would increase by 919 million and Asia’s 
working age population by 517 million (Azahaf, Kober & Mayer, 2015). Thus, the need to implement 
a fair and effective European asylum policy now is very pressing as it might be strained in the future 
even more. It is important to create such as system with a strategic view and not in a modus of short-
term crisis management. It is important to mention that a fair and effective European asylum policy 
has to be one component of a comprehensive strategy to deal with these demographic changes. 
4 The Commission’s Proposals to Reform the Common European 
Asylum System and Establish Migration Partnerships with Third 
Countries – Up to the Task? 
4.1 Status Quo and Context 
The main legislation on asylum in the EU essentially is based on five legal pillars as well as a support 
agency – the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). Together, they constitute the CEAS (see 
Box 1). The five pillars consist of two regulations (Dublin Regulation and Eurodac Regulation) and 
three directives (Asylum Procedures Directive, Qualification Directive and Receptions Conditions 
Directive). Regulations are binding legislative acts and must be fully applied by the member states. 
Directives, however, are legislative acts that only define common goals, which all member states 
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must achieve. Their implementation falls under the responsibility of the states themselves who 
establish their own laws on how to reach those goals. 
Box 1: The Main Pillars of the CEAS 
 
The CEAS was supposed to establish minimum standards for dealing with asylum processes in the 
EU. From the very beginning, though, some of its aspects have been criticised. Particularly, the 
Dublin Regulation has raised concerns for putting disproportionate pressure on the member states 
with external borders who have long been most affected by irregular migration.2 
The fundamental shortcomings of the CEAS were fully displayed when the number of people seeking 
asylum in Europe increased significantly in 2015. While the Dublin Regulation practically failed, the 
other pillars of the CEAS have been strained as well. Recognition rates, for instance, have differed 
drastically between EU countries, contributing to secondary movements of asylum seekers to only a 
                                               
2 Before 2015, the majority of irregular migrants has entered in a legal way (with a visa or as tourists on short-
term permits, for instance) but have overstayed. 
The Main Pillars of the CEAS 
 
Dublin Regulation: The Dublin Regulation determines which Member State is responsible for 
examining an asylum application in the EU. In general, the responsibility lies with the Member 
State of first entry in Europe. 
Eurodac Regulation: Eurodac is the central fingerprint database for asylum seekers in the EU. 
When someone applies for asylum in the EU, irrespective in which Member State, their 
fingerprints are transmitted to the central Eurodac system to define which Member State is 
responsible for examining the application. This is to prevent asylum seekers from lodging 
applications in other Member States. 
Asylum Procedures Directive: The Asylum Procedures Directive aims at harmonising asylum 
procedures within the EU. The directive also includes provisions for determining an asylum 
application as “unfounded” or “inadmissible”. This might be the case, if an asylum seeker entered 
the EU through a “safe third country” for instance. 
Qualification Directive: The Qualification Directive is supposed to establish common grounds 
for granting international protection and contains a series of rights for its beneficiaries (i.e. non-
refoulement, residence permits, travel documents, access to employment) 
Reception Conditions Directive: The Reception Conditions Directive tries to set common mini-
mum standards for living conditions (i.e. access to housing, food, employment, health care) of 
asylum seekers in the EU, while their applications are being processed. 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO): EASO was established in 2011 in order to 
strengthen the development of the CEAS by supporting the cooperation between Member States 
on asylum policy. 
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few countries in the EU (i.e. Germany and Sweden). Regarding recognition rates in 2015, Germany 
accepted 57% of all applications in first instance decisions, Sweden 72% and the Netherlands 80% 
(Eurostat, 2016c). Hungary (15%) or Poland (18%), on the other hand, recognised drastically fewer 
applications in comparison (Eurostat, 2016c). Most of the 174,435 first time asylum applications 
reported by Hungary for 2015 have never been decided as asylum seekers have moved to another 
country (cf. Eurostat, 2016a; 2016d). 
Acknowledging the shortcomings of the current system, the European Commission (2016c) 
presented proposals for a major reform of the CEAS “in order to move towards a fully efficient, fair 
and humane asylum policy – one which can function effectively both in times of normal and in times 
of high migratory pressure”. The main goals of the proposals are to reduce the incentives for irregular 
migration as well as improve the migration management within Europe. On 4 May and 13 July 2016, 
the Commission presented legislative proposals to 
•   reform the current regulations and directives of the CEAS; 
•  transform the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) into a significantly more capable EU      
Agency for Asylum; 
•  establish – for the first time – a common EU resettlement framework. 
Furthermore, on 7 June 2016, the Commission presented a proposal for enhanced cooperation with 
third countries through the establishment of Migration Partnerships. 
4.2 European Commission Proposals of 4 May 2016 
4.2.1 Reform of the Dublin Regulation 
Prior to the legislative proposal that was presented on 4 May 2016, the Commission had outlined 
two potential reform options for the future of the Dublin Regulation in a press release on 6 April 2016 
(European Commission, 2016a). Option number one entailed a comprehensive reform of the Dublin 
Regulation by introducing a permanent distribution mechanism for asylum seekers based on 
predefined criteria (i.e. GDP and size of population of a member state). Option number two, instead, 
foresaw to maintain the current system while adding to it a “corrective allocation mechanism” (Fair-
ness Mechanism; European Commission, 2016b) to support member states in times of dispropor-
tionate migratory pressure. Likely, because of fundamental objections towards a permanent distribu-
tion key by some member states (particularly in Eastern Europe), the Commission opted for the 
second option in the end. It foresees that if the number of asylum seekers a member state receives 
exceeds a predefined benchmark, all new incoming asylum seekers will be automatically allocated 
to other member states. This would only be the case however, if the asylum seekers’ applications 
were not found inadmissible, i.e. because of coming through a first country of asylum or a safe third 
country. If a member state would refuse to participate in the Fairness Mechanism, the member state 
would be obliged to pay €250,000 per person to the member state who would handle the application 
of the asylum seeker instead (European Commission, 2016c). 
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Furthermore, the proposed amendment to the Dublin Regulation obliges all member states to first 
assess whether an asylum application is admissible, before actually allowing the opening of a formal 
asylum procedure (ibid.). 
4.2.2 Extension of the Eurodac Regulation 
The proposal of the Commission is supposed to enable a more comprehensive acquisition and 
storage of personal data of asylum seekers in the Eurodac system, i.e. names, dates of birth, citizen-
ships and facial images (European Commission, 2016b). 
4.2.3 Establishing an EU Agency for Asylum 
The  Commission  proposes  to  transform  EASO into a “fully-fledged European Union Agency for 
Asylum with an enhanced mandate and considerably expanded tasks to address any structural 
weaknesses that arise in the application of the EU’s asylum system” (European Commission, 
2016b). The new agency has been envisaged to reduce divergences within the EU concerning the 
assessment of asylum applications and information sharing between member states. The Commis-
sion proposal includes that the new agency may deploy asylum support teams in times of dispropor-
tionate pressure to the asylum system of a member state, putting the CEAS at risk – even if the 
member state concerned is against it (European Commission, 2016c). 
4.3 European Commission Proposals of 13 July 2016 
4.3.1 Reform of the Asylum Procedures Directive 
In order to guarantee coherent asylum procedures in the EU, the Commission proposes to replace 
the current directive with a regulation (European Commission, 2016f). Thereby, the Commission 
seeks to discourage secondary movements of asylum seekers, since – so far – most of them have 
tried to reach only a few countries within the EU (i.e. Germany, Sweden, Austria and the Nether-
lands). Furthermore, the Commission proposal aims at simplifying and shortening asylum proce-
dures in the EU (max. six months; for inadmissible applications only one to two months). Moreover, 
it foresees common guarantees for asylum seekers, additional sanctions and proposals to have a 
common definition for safe third countries, in perspective culminating in a common EU list (European 
Commission, 2016g). 
4.3.2 Reform of the Qualification Directive 
The Commission proposes to replace the existing directive with a regulation to establish common 
grounds for granting international protection (European Commission, 2016f). Particularly, the propo-
sal aims at overcoming the existing divergences of EU member states’ asylum recognition rates and 
their varying definitions of protection statuses (i.e. regarding the duration of residence permits). To 
support the harmonisation, member states shall be obliged to consider country of origin-reports by 
EASO when assessing the legitimacy of asylum applications. 
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The proposed regulation also foresees a number of restrictive measures perceived to decrease the 
incentives for secondary movements of asylum seekers within the EU. For instance, by impeding 
access to long-term residence permits or by obliging member states to conduct regularly status 
reviews for refugees potentially leading to an end of the protection status (European Commission, 
2016g). 
4.3.3 Reform of the Reception Conditions Directive 
The Commission proposes to amend the current directive in order “to ensure that asylum seekers 
can benefit from harmonised and dignified reception standards throughout the EU, hence helping to 
prevent secondary movements” (European Commission, 2016f). The proposal contains measures 
to support the integration of asylum seekers, i.e. through the possibility of accessing the labour 
market after a maximum of six months – if the labour market is not strained by high unemployment 
rates and unless the asylum seekers’ applications are “likely to be unfounded and treated in an 
accelerated procedure” (European Commission, 2016g). 
A positive provision is that unaccompanied minors are to be assigned a guardian at the latest five 
days after lodging an application. At the same time, the proposal also foresees a number of restrictive 
measures, i.e. through residence and reporting restraints with the possibility of detention if “an 
asylum seeker is not complying with the obligation to reside in a specific place and where there is a 
risk of absconding” (European Commission, 2016f). 
4.4 Proposal for an EU Resettlement Framework 
On 13 July 2016, the European Commission proposed an EU Resettlement Framework to 
complement the CEAS and “ensure orderly and safe pathways to Europe for persons in need of 
international protection” (European Commission, 2016h). The new framework is meant to assist the 
implementation of migration compacts (Migration Partnerships) with designated third countries 
(countries of origin and transit; for details, see section 4.5). This is based on the idea that third 
countries might be more willing to readmit people who were denied asylum in Europe if the EU 
pledges to take in persons in need for international protection via resettlements at the same time. 
The Commission proposal introduces a permanent framework with a unified procedure for 
resettlements to the EU. However, the number of people to be resettled through the framework would 
be decided by member states themselves. Hence, member states could even decide to resettle no 
asylum seekers at all. This might be the Achilles heel of the proposal. Those who would decide to 
participate in the framework are supposed to be financially compensated with €10,000 per person 
through the European Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). Critically, only people who 
did not (attempt to) flee to the EU irregularly within the past five years, will be eligible for 
resettlements (European Commission, 2016i). 
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4.5 Proposal for Enhanced EU Cooperation with Third Countries  (Migration 
Partnerships) 
On 7 June 2016, the Commission outlined ideas for an enhanced cooperation framework with third 
countries to better manage migration (European Commission, 2016d). The proposed cooperation 
will take the form of tailored compacts (Migration Partnerships) “that will be developed according to 
the situation and needs of each partner country, depending on whether they are a country of origin, 
country of transit or a country hosting many displaced persons” (European Commission, 2016d). 
One of the key goals of the compacts is to significantly reduce irregular migration to the EU. In the 
short term, migration compacts are envisaged with Jordan and Lebanon – in the intermediate and 
long run, also with Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia, Senegal, Tunisia and Libya (European Commission, 
2016e). 
In order to actually make the Migration Partnerships work, the “full range of EU policies and external 
EU instruments” is supposed to be used – complemented by policy tools of member states 
(European Commission, 2016d). Particularly, this includes foreign, economic and development 
policy as well as cooperation on border control. If a third country denies to cooperate, development 
cooperation might be reduced. Meanwhile, the Commission proposes to increase the capacity of its 
external financial instruments (i.e. strengthening the budget of the Trust Fund for Africa with one 
billion Euro), to tackle root causes more effectively than in the past (ibid.). 
4.6 Assessment of the European Commission’s Proposals 
The proposals of the European Commission pursue three overarching objectives: 
•  Overcoming divergences between member states concerning the implementation of the CEAS, 
i.e. through replacing directives with regulations, transforming EASO into an EU Agency for 
Asylum with an extended mandate or establishing a Fairness Mechanism to allocate asylum 
seekers in the EU more fairly; 
• Discouraging secondary movements and irregular migration via restrictions and sanctions as well 
as through enhanced cooperation with third countries (Migration Partnerships); 
•  Enhancing legal pathways to Europe via an EU Resettlement Framework. 
Replacing directives with regulations is a sensible step towards harmonising asylum processes and 
recognition rates within Europe. Transforming EASO into a more capable EU Agency for Asylum to 
better support and monitor member states with the implementation of the CEAS would be an 
improvement as well. A Fairness Mechanism might also help ease the burden on those member 
states (namely Greece and Italy) who have been under enormous pressure because of irregular 
migration. Yet, it does not seem likely at the moment that there will be a consensus on some of those 
proposals (i.e. Fairness Mechanism and the EU Agency of Asylum’s right to act against the will of a 
member state). Particularly, as regards the obligation to pay €250,000 per person in case of a refusal 
to participate in the Fairness Mechanism, it is very unlikely that there will be an agreement among 
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member states. It is striking that the proposed EU Resettlement Framework, on the other hand, 
foresees to assist member states with only €10,000 per resettled person. Indeed, it might be more 
useful to significantly increase the financial and structural incentives to allocate asylum seekers (via 
relocations or resettlements). 
Overall, a consensus among member states currently seems more likely regarding the introduction 
of restrictions and sanctions to reduce irregular migration to the EU and secondary movements within 
Europe. Particularly, with respect to obligatory inadmissibility checks (proposed Dublin Regulation) 
and the stricter application of safe third country provisions (envisaged reform of the Asylum Proce-
dures Directive), which might effectively hinder many asylum seekers from lodging applications in 
the EU. Regarding the establishment of migration compacts with designated third countries (Migra-
tion Partnerships), it has to be seen, to what extent they could actually become mutually beneficial 
partnerships, respecting the rights of asylum seekers and migrants. There has been a broad range 
of critique, particularly from NGOs, which view the migration compacts as an illegitimate form of 
externalising migration control (cf., for instance, Amnesty International, 2016). Moreover, some 
members of the European Parliament voiced their concerns about the Migration Partnerships (cf. 
European Parliament, 2016). 
The proposed EU Resettlement Framework would be a significant first step to enhance legal 
pathways and effectively reduce the incentives to flee to Europe irregularly. However, given the fact 
that member states would be able to decide on the number of asylum seekers to be resettled, it 
remains to be seen whether the framework will actually be successful. 
5 Recommendations 
This chapter presents a number of policy recommendations in order to fulfil the paradigm-shift from 
a reactive to a pro-active European refugee policy. The recommendations comprise a mix of  national 
and EU-level measures and most recommendations have a national as well as an EU-level 
dimension. Of course, a coherent and effective EU refugee policy would be the most desirable 
option. However, this is difficult to achieve given the current political climate. Thus, smaller bottom-
up steps on the national level (in the same direction) in combination with top-down EU-level efforts 
may be a more pragmatic approach that might eventually lead to an effective, pro-active and fair 
European refugee policy in the future. The policy recommendations are clustered in five overarching 
themes: create safe passages to protection, improve national asylum processing and integration 
systems, establish further legal pathways for mixed migration, enable protection in the region of 
origin, tackle the root causes of forced migration through a sustainable foreign, economic and trade 
policy. A final remark highlights the importance of member states’ political will to reform current 
refugee policies. 
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5.1 Create Safe Passages to Protection 
5.1.1 Resettlement 
Resettlement from crisis countries or refugee camps in neighbouring countries allows a safe passage 
to protection. In addition, as most refugees in crisis regions do not live in refugee camps, it is 
important to identify other places, from where refugees can be resettled. As noted above, there are 
by far too few resettlement programmes worldwide. Out of the resettlement places offered, the US, 
Canada and Australia provide 90% of the global capacity (Van Selm, 2014, p. 512). In 2015, UNHCR 
indicates that 81,000 individuals departed to resettlement countries with UNHCR’s assistance 
(UNHCR, 2016d). This figure is dwarfed by the total of 16.1 million refugees under UNHCR’s 
mandate at the end of 2015 (UNHCR, 2016a). 
EU member states should increase the numbers of resettlement places available. A possible option 
is the UNHCR’s resettlement programme. The EU Resettlement Framework proposed by the 
European Commission in July 2016 might be a further option in the future, but it does not oblige 
member states to resettle refugees. Thus, it is crucial to generate the political will in EU member 
states to boost their resettlement efforts. For this to succeed, it is important that all, or most member 
states contribute to this process – according to their individual capacities. It is unlikely that only a 
few member states will undertake efforts to increase their resettlement places on their own. The 
advantages to resettlement as an effective and manageable way to cope with high refugee flows 
has to be continuously highlighted and discussed across the EU. 
However, it is critical, that offering a limited number of resettlement places is not used to legitimise 
curbing refugee flows beyond resettlement programmes and to reduce the availability of other status 
of protection (cf. Angenendt, Kipp & Meier forthcoming; Kleist, 2016). Offering increased numbers of 
resettlement places can be expected to reduce incentives for individuals to use irregular routes to 
access protection, in Europe for example. Thus, it is unlikely that increased resettlement opportuni-
ties will come on top of current refugee flows, but rather will reroute current flows via irregular routes. 
Nonetheless, it has to be mentioned that an effective but fair border management is imperative for 
EU member states to step-up their resettlement efforts. 
5.1.2 Humanitarian Visas 
Humanitarian visas represent a further option for refugees for a legal and safe route to Europe. Such 
visas could be provided by individual states unilaterally, and Brazil and Switzerland have recently 
offered humanitarian visas – although in limited numbers (cf. Betts, 2015; Thränhardt, 2016). Even 
better would be an EU-wide solution. Part of such an EU-effort could be to create small consular 
outposts outside the European Union, for instance, in Turkey or Libya (Betts, 2015). These outposts 
could be moved when migratory routes shift. Such outposts would allow people to be screened, for 
instance, by an EU Agency for Asylum, and those meeting the criteria would be granted a humani-
tarian visa. Another option could be to empower member states’ consulates to issue EU-humani-
tarian visas. Persons with a humanitarian visa could then travel to Europe by plane or ferry at their 
own expense, which would be cheaper and much safer than paying smugglers for a journey to 
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Europe. Upon arrival, the visa holder would need to file an asylum claim. An EU-humanitarian visa 
would require an EU-wide distribution mechanism. Humanitarian visas would work best if offered to 
nationals from countries with high protection rates. This could counter the argument, critics of such 
an approach might put forward, that humanitarian visas might represent a further pull factor for 
individuals with little chances of being recognised as refugees to seek protection in Europe. A slight 
increase of refugees from the most crisis-torn regions would certainly be an acceptable price to pay 
for one further step towards a fair and effective EU refugee policy (Betts, 2015). 
The idea of humanitarian visas for refugees has a historical precedent: the Nansen Passports used 
by the League of Nations. Between 1922 and 1942, the scheme was recognized by over 50 countries 
and enabled around 450,000 people, including Assyrian, Armenian and Turkish refugees, to travel 
safely to Europe (Betts, 2015; Wallaschek, 2016). In recognition of its achievements, the Nansen 
International Refugee Office received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1938. 
5.1.3 Private Sponsorship of Refugees 
Private sponsorship programmes for refugees provide for another safe way to reach a country 
offering protection and offers many advantages, also for paving the way for refugees to integrate in 
the host society. Private sponsorship can supplement traditional refugee resettlement programmes, 
by means of communities and other nongovernmental entities directly supporting the arrival and 
integration of persons in need of protection (Collett, Clewett, & Fratzke, 2016, p. 22). To be 
successful, the design of such sponsorship programmes is crucial: Guidelines should present the 
purpose of private sponsorships, who is eligible to sponsor and be sponsored, the responsibilities of 
sponsors, and the safety net in place should problems arise (Kumin, 2015, p. 1). 
A well-developed good policy-practice has been implemented by Canada.3  It allows private citizens 
to play a role in Canada’s refugee policy. A sponsorship usually starts with a group of friends, family, 
neighbours or colleagues who get together and decide they want to be sponsors. The group often 
already knows a refugee who they want to sponsor. Sponsors close a contract with the Canadian 
government and sponsors commit to providing emotional, material and financial support for one full 
year (Omidvar, 2015). 
The programme builds social capital and is an effective tool for settlement. Refugees who are pri-
vately sponsored have better employment outcomes than those who are sponsored by government 
or who claim asylum in Canada: In the first two years of arrival, private sponsored refugees in 
Canada earned or exceeded a salary of C$20,000 – higher than any other refugee group (Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada, 2012, p. 8). 
 
                                               
3 Further information on the Canadian Private Sponsorship Programme can be found here: http://www.cic.gc. 
ca/english/resources/publications/ref-sponsor/index.asp?utm_source=immigration.gc.ca%2Frefsponsor-
ship& utm_medium=URL_direct&utm_campaign=form-help. 
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There is not one single model for private sponsorship programmes and they need to be adopted to 
the specific country context. But a well thought through implementation of such programmes in the 
EU and its member states would be an important supplement to resettlement programmes and 
constitute an effective way to provide legal routes for refugees to Europe, in combination with good 
integration prospects. 
5.2 Improve National Asylum Processing and Integration Systems 
5.2.1 Effective National Asylum Systems 
In the absence of a fully-fledged EU-asylum procedure, EU member states need effective national 
systems for processing asylum claims and dealing with asylum seekers. They need to possess the 
capacity to process asylum claims efficiently, provide adequate housing, integrate those with 
protection status into society, and keep careful track of the identities of asylum seekers in the country. 
It is important that national authorities demonstrate their ability to act. This still requires significant 
efforts across the EU because opportunities to improve capacity in recent years were missed. It is 
equally important to keep asylum systems flexible so they can cope with fluctuating demand – also 
with support by an EU Agency for Asylum (Mayer, 2016, pp. 7-8). 
5.2.2 Labour Market Integration of Refugees 
Labour market integration of refugees is as essential part of a sustainable refugee integration in host 
societies as well as a life in dignity. The UN Development Report (2015, p.1) states: “Ultimately, work 
unleashes human potential, human creativity and the human spirit.” Effective labour market 
integration of refugees is consequently a crucial part of a sustainable refugee policy. However, labour 
market outcomes of refugees tend to be poor. On average, it takes refugees up to 20 years to have 
a similar employment rate as the native-born (OECD, 2016, p. 21). Support measures can help 
refugees to find an employment commensurate to their qualifications and skills. 
Most refugees do not have formal qualifications or the documents that prove they do. But often 
refugees possess competencies that they have acquired non-formally or informally. A flexible skills 
assessment and possibilities for modular qualifications are needed (for refugees, but also in general). 
This could also meet the expectations of refugees to be employed early (Aumüller, 2016a). 
As many refugees will not be able to access the regular labour market because of lacking formal 
qualifications and language proficiency, concepts are needed to avoid future long-term unemploy-
ment of refugees. Job opportunities outside the private labour market which are combined with 
language tuition, skills development, job application training etc. might represent one possibility. 
Possibilities of a social labour market should be explored – otherwise there is the danger, that 
refugees might move into the informal labour market instead (Aumüller, 2016b). If well managed, 
such publicly funded not-for-profit jobs can also bring symbolic returns to society that in turn might 
increase acceptance of asylum seekers amongst the population. 
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It is important that labour market support measures start early, i.e. already during the application 
process. Labour market integration of asylum-seekers and refugees should be handled as a flexible 
process which focuses on the individual requirements of the persons concerned. A long-lasting linear 
process – first step: language proficiency, second step: skills assessment, third step: getting 
vocational orientation and so on – should be avoided. Instead, the different elements of labour 
market integration should be paralleled. Refugees should benefit from an individual coaching which 
also takes into account the needs of social integration – passing the legal asylum procedure, 
accommodation, family unification, coping with trauma etc. (Aumüller, 2016b). 
5.2.3 Voluntary Return 
The focus on recent policy proposals, such as the New Migration Partnership Framework4 or the 
regulation on a European travel document for the return of illegally staying third country nationals5   
proposed by the European Commission, has been on the return of persons who are not eligible for 
a protection status. While this is an important feature of an effective refugee policy, also the return 
of persons with protection status needs to be part of a forward-looking EU refugee policy. If the 
causes for refugee migration in the country of origin subside, return to the country or region of origin 
may be an important option for refugees. Return has to happen voluntarily to be a safe process – in 
accordance with the principle of non-refoulement (Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015, p. 2; United States Insti-
tute for Peace, 2016). 
Re-establishing economic livelihoods, political capital, and social networks can pose serious 
challenges (Hammond, 2014, p. 508). The EU and member states should provide assistance to 
facilitate the return process of refugees. For return to be a smooth process, a few principles need to 
be kept in mind: Post-conflict situations are transitory processes and cannot be equated with the end 
of all conflict and significant levels of violence might continue to exist (Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015, p. 1). 
Return and local integration should not be set against each other. The experiences and 
competencies acquired in the country offering protection might be helpful for re-integrating in the 
country of origin (Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015, p. 4). Thus, investments of receiving countries in refugees’ 
integration can also be investments in stabilising the region or country of origin economically and 
politically. Moreover, returning refugees may serve as channels for invisible transfers of modernity, 
social and political changes, and learning processes at the family, community and citizenship level 
(cf. Garson, 2015, p. 19). Also the experiences and competencies acquired in the country offering 
protection might be helpful for re-integrating in the country of origin (Bohnet & Rudolf, 2015, p. 4). 
Finally, relief and development efforts should be part of any sustainable return programme (Bohnet 
& Rudolf, 2015, p. 5). 
 
                                               
4 COM(2016) 385 final. 
5 COM(2015) 668 final. 
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In Germany, the Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM) runs the Migration for 
Development Programme which offers support to returning experts (Heimer & Münch, 2015, pp. 46-
47).6 The programme includes individual counselling regarding return and career planning, 
information on the origin country’s labour market, job-placement services, continuing support in re-
entering a career within the home country, and the provision of local contacts. In certain cases, 
financial grants by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) are 
provided, toward travel, transportation, and the establishment of a workplace. Another programme 
helps migrants to start a business in their home country.7 While these programmes do not have a 
refugee focus, they offer important insights for return programmes targeting refugees. 
5.2.4 Reform of the Dublin System 
The structural deficits of the Dublin system have to be overcome in order for national asylum 
procedures to function effectively and fairly. The responsibility to grant protection to those individuals 
in need has to be shared across EU member states – taking into account different national resources 
and histories. One step towards a fairer distribution of asylum seekers represents the Commission’s 
“corrective allocation mechanism” proposed on 4 May 2016; however, it might be useful to step up 
incentives to distribute asylum seekers (cf. section 4.6). Initially, the Commission’s considerations 
included a more wide-ranging option of a permanent distribution mechanism presented on 6 April 
2016, which was then abandoned in favour of the more modest “corrective allocation mechanism” 
(cf. section 4.2.1). Given the current political climate, a fundamental overhaul seems impossible to 
realise in the near future and smaller steps of reform are preferable to a standstill. Nonetheless, a 
more ambitious reform of the Dublin system should remain a medium-term objective. 
Countries without borders with third-countries, such as Germany, have for a long-time benefitted 
from the Dublin system. Even though its shortcomings were obvious and the southern “frontier 
countries” had to shoulder most of the burden. Now, the situation has changed and Germany is 
amongst the greatest supporters of a new EU-wide distribution mechanism for refugees. To convince 
other countries to accept any form of such a system, this history has to be taken into account. Hence, 
the way towards any serious EU-distribution mechanism is likely to proceed in small steps and to 
entail concessions to countries carrying the largest burden under the current Dublin system. 
5.3 Establish Further Legal Pathways for Mixed Migration 
As discussed above, migrants often migrate because of a mix of motivations. Many individuals who 
claim asylum migrate out of economic necessity and do not qualify for a status of protection. 
Expanding the opportunities to migrate to the EU through new economic migration channels might 
contribute to disentangling mixed migration flows and to reducing the pressure on asylum systems. 
Even though, the quantitative potential of this way is likely to be limited. There are a number of ways 
                                               
6 More information on the programme can be found here: http://www.cimonline.de/en/61.asp.  
7 More information on the programme can be found here: http://www.cimonline.de/en/2593.asp#top. 
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to migrate to EU member states for employment reasons, but these pathways tend to be restricted 
to skilled and highly skilled workers (seasonal workers programmes can be an exception). In order 
to separate economic from refugee migration, the establishment of new migration channels for un-
skilled workers needs to be discussed. Currently, this is largely unpopular in EU countries and politi-
cally not to be realised. But it might be an option in the future, when demographic aging and shrinking 
in Europe has progressed further. It is crucial, however, that this is supplemented by efforts to 
improve labour force participation of the domestic population and the upgrading of working conditions 
of currently rather unpopular professions, such as caretaking. 
5.4 Enable Protection in the Region of Origin 
5.4.1 Temporary Protection in Refugee Camps in the Regions of Origin 
Protection in the region of origin can serve as an intermediate solution to cope with refugee flows. 
Refugee camps in neighbouring countries, for instance, can offer individuals in need of protection a 
safe place in relative vicinity to their home country, thereby avoiding to embark on dangerous 
journeys to other safe countries; a further beneficial side-effect comprises reduced revenues for 
smugglers. Refugee camps can be a reasonable policy option in particular if it is unclear how long a 
particular crisis situation will persist. In case the situation is resolved, refugees will be able to return 
to their home country soon and contribute to rebuilding and stabilising the country, for example. 
In order for refugee camps in crisis regions to be a viable option, it is important that they are well 
funded. Chronic underfunding of organisations, such as the UN World Food Programme led to 
reduced food allowances for refugees in Jordan and Lebanon in early 2015. These deteriorating cir-
cumstances drove many refugees to seek better living conditions elsewhere (Mayer, 2016, p. 4). 
This was one of the chief drivers that caused the massive refugee inflow in Europe in 2015 that the 
EU and its member states found difficult to manage. Hence, well-funded refugee camps in neigh-
bouring countries can be an important buffer – especially in times of high refugee migration from one 
region of origin – and should be part of a pro-active EU-refugee policy. From there, refugees could 
travel to other places offering sustainable protection, for instance, through resettlement programmes, 
private sponsorship programmes or humanitarian visas. It is important that the time refugees spend 
in camps is used properly; just offering protection without anything else is not enough. Education, 
qualification measures, and work opportunities can both improve the labour market integration 
prospects in later host countries as well as contribute to stabilising their home country in case of 
return. Refugee camps should only serve as intermediate solutions to refugeehood and should not 
externalise the responsibility for a sustainable EU-refugee policy to countries in crisis regions. 
5.4.2 Local Integration in the Region of Origin 
Local integration in neighbouring countries is another source of protection for refugees. Estimates 
indicate that, in Turkey for instance, around 20% of all refugees live in camps and around 80% in 
Turkish cities (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). In Jordan, around 80% of all Syrian refugees live outside 
camps, mostly in the cities of Irbid and Amman (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016a). In Lebanon, the 
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government seeks to avoid establishing camps for Syrian refugees. Thus, most Syrian refugees live 
in improvised tent settlements, garages, unfinished houses, or even flats (if they can afford it) (Ber-
telsmann Stiftung, 2016b). 
Refugees in neighbouring countries mostly live in precarious situations without the right to work or 
to receive social benefits and often do not have access to healthcare. European governments need 
to work with countries in crisis regions to improve and legalise the status of refugees. This will 
necessitate significant investments. A further option comprises the support of civil society initiatives 
that can provide food or education. 
5.5 Tackle the Root Causes of Forced Migration through a Sustainable 
Foreign, Economic and Trade Policy 
A sustainable solution to the large asylum inflows to the EU must address the root causes of forced 
migration. This is an extremely challenging task and might require EU member states to make 
concessions. Tackling the root causes includes ending the conflict in Syria and putting a stop to the 
terror of the Islamic State group. Moreover, it involves helping refugees’ and migrants’ home 
countries to develop. In addition to development cooperation, trade and economic policy must be 
viewed in a differed light – beyond the traditionally narrow notion of national interests. 
Article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty states, “[…] The Union shall take account of the objectives of 
development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing 
countries.” This principle needs to be incorporated better in policy-making of the EU and its member 
states. Short-term gains of certain economic and trade policies need to be replaced by a more long-
term and holistic view of policy-making. For instance, jobs in developing countries need to be decent. 
The long-term costs of underdevelopment will dwarf any short-term gains through cheap production 
sites of European corporations in developing countries. Another field of action could be reducing 
subsidies for agricultural production in Europe or improving the prospects for businesses in 
developing countries. In addition, simplifying remittance transfers and targeted investments by the 
diaspora community should be part of a sustainable development policy for countries of origin 
(Mayer, 2016, p. 9). 
Serious investments in developing countries of origin constitute an important part of tackling the root 
causes of forced migration. For instance, states attending President Obama’s Leaders Summit on 
Refugees in September 2016 have committed to increase their 2016 financial contributions to UN 
appeals and international humanitarian organisations by around $4.5 billion over 2015 levels (The 
White House, 2016). When compared to the funding gap for humanitarian action of estimated $15 
billion, this is clearly not enough and even higher spending is necessary (cf. High-Level Panel on 
Humanitarian Financing). It might also be worthy to discuss the role private sector organisations 
might be able to play to supplement those funds. 
Asylum policy can no longer be reduced to dealing with the people who arrive at our doorstep. 
Rather, it must acknowledge the connectedness of the world and the fact that people emigrate out 
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of desperation. It is time that the EU and the world’s other developed economies tackle the root 
causes of migration flows. If they do not, the number of migrants to Europe is bound to increase 
further (Mayer, 2016, p. 9). 
5.6 Final Remark: Establish Political Will for Reform 
The above recommendations require member states’ political will. However, since the significant 
inflow of asylum seekers in 2015 added another difficult situation to the EU’s list of challenges, 
member states have been unable to find any sustainable concerted European solutions. A key 
challenge for the EU and member states to manage migration effectively and pro-actively represents 
the question of how member states can align their national interests and find common ground to 
tackle this massive challenge together. Certainly, there is no silver bullet to create political will 
amongst member states, however, a few steps towards similar national policies might help and might 
lay the foundation of a more comprehensive European refugee policy. For instance, member states 
need to have a shared foreign policy vision. This means, that they have to establish a common 
understanding of the political situations in origin countries of refugees. Only if this can be achieved, 
a harmonisation of national protection rates – or even EU-level asylum procedures – are thinkable. 
Migration policy needs to be based on a forward-looking and coherent strategy. It cannot consist of 
short-term and reactive crisis management. Migration flows need to be monitored, and large spikes 
need to be forecasted as far ahead as possible (Mayer, 2016, p. 8). The EU and member states 
need to demonstrate that they are in control of refugee flows. In addition, an effective and fair asylum 
policy should be insulated from populist debates, but at the same time not left for elites to shape on 
their own. This is a delicate task, and to strike the right balance, a strong civil society and transparent 
policy-making are needed (Mayer, 2016, p. 8). Constant dialogue about refugee policy between and 
within member states is imperative. 
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